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ABSTRACT 
One of the key concepts in recent moral debates is respect.  The paper establishes the 
thesis that respect must first be understood as a responsive deontic demand. This occurs if 
beyond a universalisation of the practical law it keeps open the connection to the various 
pronominal versions and is shaped as response to a call which does not follow classical 
schemes of mere reciprocity but which takes into account the asymmetry of the other. For 
this reason main accounts of respect in contexts of human dignity (Immanuel Kant, Axel 
Honneth, Rainer Forst and others) are questioned in the horizon of the philosophy of 
Bernhard Waldenfels.  
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0. Introduction 
 
The moral importance of respect for persons is widely recognized. Some 
authors consider the attitude of respect for persons to be the paramount 
moral attitude and all other moral principles and attitudes are to be 
explained in terms of it. One of the most vigorous current discussions is 
devoted to the connex of personality, liberty and responsibility, which is 
embedded in the discourse on human dignity. Both the metaphysical as well 
as the linguistic-analytical positions share a conviction here, namely the 
distinction between a “someone” and a “something”. Moral-philosophical 
problems arise in the shift from “someone” to “something”, for example in 
the context of the "use of embryos" in the social-philosophical debates on the 
reification and monetarisation of people, in the debates on the distribution of 
resources, etc. It is symptomatic that all methodical approaches take as a 
subject the feeling of unease induced by this shift. Only three representatives 
are taken as examples here. The phenomenologist Bernhard Waldenfels as 
well as representatives of discourse theory describe what it means when 
someone who encounters us is treated like "a mere thing" or "thin air".1 The 
                                                 
1 Waldenfels, Bernhard, Phänomenologie der Aufmerksamkeit, Frankfurt am Main 2004, S. 
280. Dieser Text wurde in verschiedenen Varianten als Vortrag präsentiert, und zwar als 
„Ethik der Achtung“ der internationalen Tagung „Ansprüche der Ethik“ (Societas 
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analytical philosopher Ansgar Beckermann links this transition to a change 
in perspective, marked by a switch in personal pronouns. “We […] adopt 
quite different attitudes to our fellow human beings compared to inanimate 
objects or machines [...] We are grateful if someone does us a good turn; we 
are offended if they do us harm or do not pay us the proper respect […]. By 
contrast, if we notice that someone suffers from a disorder which in general 
renders them unable to control their behaviour, this realisation not only leads 
to a different assessment of the conduct of the person involved; it leads to a 
fundamental change in my attitude towards this person. I begin to cease to 
regard them as a responsible person, but rather as someone who needs 
treatment [...] In other words, I begin to assume an objective attitude towards 
this person. If there were no liberty we would have to assume only this 
objective attitude to our fellow human beings. We could never be grateful, 
never be offended by someone, never really love or hate.”2 
A solution for this problem would appear to be a theory of respect. If we put 
aside the many questions regarding status, condition, conceptualisation and 
contextualisation of respect and dignity at this point, the following answers 
would appear to suggest themselves. In the first place respect describes a 
necessary leap, which is evident in the question how participants in a society 
become moral participants in a moral society.3 Secondly, it would appear to 
indicate how from a self-determination (as a key concept of modernity) a 
claim can be derived, e.g. a claim to the preservation of human dignity.4 
Thirdly, respect would appear to form a link between generalised central 
concepts (e.g. the “empty formula” of human dignity) and the avoidance of 
injuries as expression of a respectful attitude. This link would signalise the 
transition from conventional substance concepts to moral performance 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ethica, Leysin/Schweiz, 22.-26.8.2007), in einer mehr auf die Menschenwürde zugespitzten 
Fassung als „Ethics of respect and human dignity“ an der Duquesne University in 
Pittsburgh (USA 29.1.2007) und als Vortrag an der Tilburg University in den 
Niederlanden (6.5.2009). Ein kurzer Artikel zum Stichwort Achtung erscheint in dem von 
mir mit Rudolf Gröschner und Oliver W. Lembcke herausgegebenen Handbuch 
Menschenwürde (Fink/UTB 2012). 
2 Beckermann, Ansgar, „Freier Wille – Alles Illusion?“ in: Stephan Barton (Hg.), …weil er 
für die Allgemeinheit gefährlich ist! Prognosegutachten, Neurobiologie, Sicherungsverwahrung, 
Baden-Baden 2006, S. 293-307, hier S. 295. Beckermann geht hier auf Strawson zurück. 
3 Es ist nicht unbedeutend, dass Tugendhat diesen Übergang mit einer Theorie der 
Selbstachtung beschreibt, auf die wir hier allerdings nicht eingehen können. 
4 Dieser Gedanke steht im Hintergrund der Überlegungen von Micha H. Werner in 
„Menschenwürde in der bioethischen Debatte – Eine Diskurstopologie“, in: Kettner, 
Matthias (Hg.), Biomedizin und Menschenwürde, Frankfurt am Main 2004, S. 191-220, hier 
S. 204. 
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concepts.5 However, for this it would be necessary to put aside the 
“secondary” versions of respect (appraisal in Darwall6; reverentia or fear-
respect in Feinberg7; or also the versions of Hudson8) in favour of a strong 
respect in the context of an acknowledgement. The strong form of respect 
would in particular make clear the aspect of coercion, which indicates the 
moral transition. This is the point of departure for the thesis of this talk: 
respect must first be understood in its character as a responsive deontic 
demand. This occurs if beyond a universalisation of the practical law it keeps 
open the connection to the various pronominal versions and is shaped as 
response to a call which does not follow classical schemes of mere reciprocity 
but which takes into account the asymmetry of the other. For this reason 
main accounts of respect are questioned in the horizon of the philosophy of 
Bernhard Waldenfels.9  
To this end the train of thought will be developed in the following steps: 1. In 
the first step the role of respect in Kant‟s moral theory is explained. 2. In the 
second step, this construction is linked with the considerations of two 
discourse theories. 3. In a third step the findings are deepened by reference to 
a theory of responsivity. Finally, several perspectives are intended to present 
the relevance of a theory of respect in the context of human dignity.  
 
 
1. Immanuel Kant: Respect for the practical law 
 
a) Respect is considered first to be an attitude, that is a disposition to 
considerate behaviour. It it that action which is morally required by all vis-à-
vis all. Respect here is not a feeling, but rather a form of behaviour, which 
                                                 
5 Dies wird in verschienen Ansätzen deutlich, so beispielsweise in der Ausdruckstheorie, die 
Anton Leist im Rahmen einer Postkantischen Moraltheorie entwickelt, aber auch in den 
juristischen Interpretationen des systemtheoretischen Moraltheorie, wie sie von Seelmann, 
Podlech u.a., aber auch von Philosophen wie  Stöcker eingesetzt wird. 
6 Darwall, Stephen, The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability, 
Cambridge, MA 2006; „Two Kinds of Respect“, in: Ethics 88 (1977), S. 36-49. 
7 Feinberg, Joel, 1975, „Some Conjectures on the Concept of Respect“, in: Journal of 
Social Philosophy 4 (1975), S. 1-3. 
8 Die vier Typen des evaluativen, des Hindernis- des Richtlinien- oder des institutionellen 
Respektes können wir hier ausklammern, siehe: Hudson, S.D., „The Nature of Respect“, 
in: Social Theory and Practice 6 (1980), S. 69-90. 
9 Mit dieser Philosophie setze ich mich auseinander in meinem Text „Responsive 
Philosophie. Darlegung der Grundzüge“ in der von mir initiierten Tagung und dem Band 
m von , in: Kapust, Antje/ Busch, Kathrin/ Därmann, Iris, (Hg.), Philosophie der 
Responsivität. Festschrift für Bernhard Waldenfels (hg. von Antje Kapust, Iris Därmann 
und Kathrin Busch, München 2007, S. 15-34). 
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people owe each other.10 It occurs in the form of a debt: “Hence, respect 
which I have for others or which someone can else can demand from me is the 
acknowledgement of the dignity of other people"11 and “everyone has a 
lawful claim to respect from his fellows and is in turn committed to it vis-à-
vis everyone else.”12 Respect as an attitude of general consideration is 
demanded in the categorical imperative, especially in the “end in itself” 
formula. 
b) Separate from this is a second meaning of respect, which can be neglected 
here, but which should be mentioned: this is respect as moral esteem. What 
we have to do with here is respect as appreciation of people on account of 
particular moral achievements and merits.13 This is above all the case when 
someone especially well exemplifies those characteristics which we demand 
from each other morally.  
Moral appreciation can be regarded as a gradual phenomenon, which is 
accompanied by a feeling of acknowledgement vis-à-vis the appreciated 
person. The negative complement consists in disdain. An exaggerated version 
consists in admiration. Admiration would be equivalent to uprightness of 
character. “Admiration is a tribute we cannot deny to merit.”14 The echo of 
the ancient understanding of dignity, which centred on merita, emerges 
clearly. 
c) This overlaps with Kant‟s third meaning of respect. Only the theory of 
respect as a moral feeling answers the question regarding moral motivation. 
Kant looked for a source of motivation for moral conduct, a moral 
mainspring. In order for reasons for action to be effectively expressed in 
action they must have an affective content, i.e. they have to be emotionally 
loaded. The source of motivation for an action is sought similar to Hume in 
feelings, albeit in an intelligible feeling. Let us first recall the facts of the 
matter. 
Kant emphasises the gulf between moral knowledge and corresponding 
conduct with the thesis that the difficult tasks is finding a bridge between 
these two aspects: “If by reason I judge an action to be morally good, there is 
still a long way to go before I perform the action. Reason must have a 
motivating force to move the will to perform an action.”15 
                                                 
10 Kant, vgl. die Tugendlehre, § 25, S. 449); (Tugendlehre § 24, S. 449). 
11 Ebd., § 37, S. 462.  
12 Ebd. § 38, S. 462. 
13 Gosepath, Stefan, „Tugendhats Konzeption moralischer Begründung und Motivation“, 
in: Scarano, Nico / Suárez, Mauricio (Hg.), Ernst Tugendhats Ethik. Einwände und 
Erwiderungen, München 2006, S. 153-170 
14 Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft 77. 
15 Kant, Ethikvorlesung, Nachschrift Moral Mongrovius, AA und XX XII: 1428.  
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Consequently, Günther Patzig has made the diagnosis “that Kant 
endeavoured to bind the fact of reason or the awareness of duty and the 
motive also to act in accordance with this duty so closely to each other that 
while the general insight admittedly remained correct according to which one 
needed a subjective movens, a principium executionis, at the same time, 
however, this mainspring was brought so close to the practical law and 
identified with it, that no one could arrive at the conclusion that what was 
involved here was a quite ordinary, empirical mainspring.”16 
Hence, for Kant the theory of the moral feeling of respect functioned as a 
theory of moral motivation. Kant identified this moral feeling in the 
Grundlegung as a feeling of respect. For him respect is the title for the specific 
moral source of motivation, that is a moral action, for action deriving from 
respect for the moral law.17 
Respect is a self-wrought feeling, but in terms of consciousness “the 
subjection of my will to a law without the mediation of other influences on 
my intelligence.” This direct determination of will by the law and 
consciousness thereof is called respect. 
Respect for the law is the only moral incentive.18 For this reason Volker 
Gerhardt recognises in this passage the important transition from 
anthropology to ethics in the form of a transition from a “realm of nature” to 
“realm of freedom.”19 Dieter Sturma emphasises this aspect by pointing out, 
with the bioethical debates in mind, that respect is the “constructive core of 
an autonomy concept” and in this way underlining the essential relevance of 
self-determination.20 As part of a political ethics Wolfgang Kersting 
emphasises the significance of this respect within the framework of a concept 
                                                 
16 Patzig, Günther, „Die logischen Formen praktischer Sätze in Kants Ethik“, in: Prauss, 
Gerold (Hg.), Kant. Zur Deutung seiner Theorie von Erkennen und Handeln, Köln 1973, S. 
207 – 222, S. 207; Für Kant ist die sittliche Einsicht der Stein der Weisen. Zur Ausführung 
moralischer Handlung braucht man folglich ein subjektives Prinzip, und dieses ist die 
Triebfeder bzw. das moralische Gefühl: „Es sieht ein jeder ein, wenn eine Handlung 
verabscheuenswürdig ist, nur der aber der diesen Abscheu empfindet, hat ein moralisches 
Gefühl. Der Verstand verabscheut nicht, sondern er sieht die Abscheulichkeit ein, und 
widersetzt sich derselben, die Sinnlichkeit aber muß nur verabscheuen. Wenn nun die 
Sinnlichkeit dasjenige verabscheut, was der Verstand für abscheulich hält, so ist dies das 
moralische Gefühl.“ (aus Kant Mongrovius AA, XX XII: 1429) 
17 Zu rekonstruieren ist, wie Hegel diese Tugendpflicht Kants in eine Rechtspflicht 
verwandelt (Hegel, Rechtsphilosophie § 36) und aus dieser Transformation die 
rechtswissenschaftliche bedeutsame Formel eines rechts auf Rechte abgeleitet wird. 
18 Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, § 78. 
19 Gerhardt, Volker / Kaulbach, Friedrich (Hg.), Kant, Darmstadt 1979, S. 88 - 90.  
20 Sturma, Dieter, „Kants Ethik der Autonomie“, in: Ameriks, Karl / Sturma, Dieter 
(Hg.), Kants Ethik, Paderborn 2004, S. 160 – 177, hier S. 172. 
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of reason, which includes the sub-systems of a society.21 Dieter Henrich 
characterises this reason concept in distinction from classic ontologies: 
However, at this point the Kant interpreter Ottfried Höffe recalls into 
memory that this form of respect requires closer examination if legality is not 
to be regarded as morality. Höffe reflects on the dimensions of a concept of 
duty, which opposes situative contextualisations, as intended by McDowell. 
He accuses numerous forms of ethics of misjudging this core: “All forms of 
ethics, which define morality merely in concepts of duties, standards, values 
or more recently, given the preference for procedures, of procedural 
regulations, therefore do not merely represent an inadequate moral 
philosophy, but according to Kant's strict concepts no moral philosophy at 
all." This is because they do not admit any theory of the purely good with 
regard to the active subject. Whether one thinks of the older value ethics of a 
Max Scheler […], the various kinds of utilitarianism or the Erlangen model 
of reasonable conflict resolution […], the universalisation principle […] or 
the behaviourist and sociological theories […] – they are all at best theories 
of acting in accordance with duty: theories of legal, but not of moral practice. 
This probably also applies to the more recent constructivism of John Rawls 
and his independent pupils Herman, Korsgaard and O‟Neill.” 22  
Problems do indeed arise at this point. These become all the more serious , 
since the theory of respect is at the centre of all Kantian key concepts, which 
in the final analysis with the end in itself formula tend towards the theory of 
human dignity. In Kant respect is localised in the context of dignity, which is 
expressed in the famous humanity formulation of the categorical imperative: 
“Act in a way that you treat humanity, both in your person as well as in the 
person of everyone else, at all times as an end, never merely as a means.” This 
thought first states that due to their reasonable nature people are ends in 
themselves, as a result of which it may be demanded of us that we respect 
them. “Respect which I have for someone else, or which someone else can 
demand from me (observantia aliis praestanda) is hence acknowledgement of 
a dignity (dignitas) in other people, i.e. of a value which has no price, no 
equivalent, against which the object of appreciation (aestimii) could be 
exchanged.”23 
We are morally in debt to the other person, but which is characterised by a 
symptomatic dilemma. The Kant interpreter Thomas Hill considers the 
realm of ends as an “ideal model of a systematic connection of various 
                                                 
21 Kersting, Wolfgang, „Vernunft, Verbindlichkeit und Recht bei Kant“, in: Ameriks, 
Karl / Sturma, Dieter (Hg.), Kants Ethik, a.a.O., 269 – 290.  
22 Höffe, Otfried, „Kant über Recht und Moral“, in: Ameriks, Karl / Sturma, Dieter (Hg.), 
Kants Ethik, a.a.O., S. 249 – 268, hier S. 260 und 261. 
23 AA VI S. 462. 
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reasonable creatures as a result of common laws” who can be regarded as 
legislators who are simultaneously subject to the law.24 Habermas transforms 
this model into a model25 of reflexive communication in which the authors are 
simultaneously the adressees. Yet this realm appears to be an “ideal condition, 
which would only become reality if everyone obeyed the moral law (and God 
guaranteed that the personal ends of the virtuous would not be 
systematically frustrated).”26 On the other hand, we get into problems if the 
concepts of person and human being are no longer equivalent, as is the case in 
the marginal areas of human life. This applies above all to people who a) are 
not yet persons (embryos), who b) are no longer persons (coma patients, 
dementia sufferers), c) who will never be persons (severely handicapped) or d) 
who could be considered as persons, but are not human beings (animals, 
robots capable of learning or intelligent machines).27 
 
 
2. Axel Honneth: Discoursive transformation of respect 
 
Axel Honneth approaches the problem in the context of negative forms 
caused as disruptiptions of acknowledgement and disdain.28 He investigates 
the question what exactly has to be added to “perception” for it to pass from 
the aesthetic level to the moral philosophy relevant level of 
acknowledgement.29 That this question is not insignificant is shown if it is 
interpreted as a translation attempt of legal concerns into political ethical 
analyses. The democratic constitutional state has admittedly abolished grave 
forms of the infringement of human dignity such as the slavery or torture, 
but political context observations make clear that in reality and practically 
                                                 
24 Hill, Thomas E., „Die Würde der Person. Kant, Probleme und ein Vorschlag“, in: 
Stoecker, Ralf (Hg.), Menschenwürde. Annäherungen an einen Begriff, Wien o.J., S. 153-
173, hier S. 158; GS. 433. 
25 Waldenfels, Bernhard, Phänomenologie der Aufmerksamkeit, a.a.O., S. 272 
26 Hill, „Die Würde der Person. Kant, Probleme und ein Vorschlag“, a.a.O., S. 158. 
27 Birnbacher, Dieter, „Menschenwürde - abwägbar oder unabwägbar?“, in: Kettner, 
Matthias (Hg.) Biomedizin und Menschenwürde, Frankfurt 2004, S. 249- 271). Der 
Neuroinformatiker Christoph von der Malsburg versucht, Gehirnaktivitäten zu ergründen 
und sie für die Erforschung technischer Anwendungen fruchtbar zu machen. Als einer der 
wenigen Forscher ist er sich jedoch der Gefahr bewusst, dass zukünftige „selbststeuernde 
Maschinen mit Gehirnäquivalenzen“, wenn sie den Status „lebendiger Organismen“ oder 
sogar von Personen erreicht haben könnten, den Menschen das Zepter aus der Hand 
nehmen könnten. 
28 Honneth, Axel, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, 
Frankfurt am Main 2. Aufl. 2008, S. 221. 
29 Honneth, Axel, Unsichtbarkeit. Stationen einer Theorie der Intersubjektivität, Frankfurt 
am Main 2003, S. 11. 
ANTJE KAPUST 
158 
 
interaction relationships are still observable in which people are treated as 
“second class” and consequently injured in their claims to dignity and 
respect. Honneth devotes himself to these problems by reference to the 
problem of “making invisible” which he demonstrates on the basis of the 
novel “The invisible man” by Ralph Ellison. The white protagonists of this 
novel “want to do everything to show the black man present that he was 
invisible to them.” 30 This form of “making disappear” is not due to a form of 
“physical non-presence”, but rather to the social meaning of an attributed non-
existence.31 Interestingly, Honneth embodies the analysis of this problem in a 
dialogue structure, by showing the respect of the other by the action of a 
subject given with the “expressive act through which this recognition is 
endowed with the positive meaning of an approval."32  
In this act of approval respect is linked to the condition of a “motivational 
readiness” which permits a recourse to Kant: “As a result we are in a position 
to establish a connection to the Kantian concept of „respect‟.”33 Honneth goes 
back to Kant‟s formulation from Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals 
in which Kant says of respect “that it is the idea of a value which demolishes 
my self-love”34 Honneth tries to combine the motivational readiness with the 
obligatory power of a claim. For this purpose he emphasises in a first step the 
role of respect as an “original fact”: What Kant describes as “demolition of 
self-love" in his opinion makes clear that "it is not the subject himself here 
which imposes a restriction on himself, the effective power is far rather the 
act of 'respect' as such, so that the suppression of egocentric inclinations in 
the subject himself is as it were necessarily achieved”. 
Kant‟s extreme constraint character is elegantly weakened be referring to the 
motivation, but emphazied in the paradigm of the mother caring for her 
baby. This “acquisition” of respect looks like the solution of a deus ex 
machina. However, to prevent this impression, Honneth attempts a quasi-
volontarist reinterpretation of respect: “In the acknowledging subject a 
decentering occurs, because it grants a value to another subject, which is the 
                                                 
30 Honneth, ebd., S. 11. Diese Exklusion betrifft natürlich ebenso Fragen der verweigerten 
Gleichberechtigung und tangiert damit eine Beziehung, die Harry G. Frankfurt 
untersucht („Equality and Respect“, in: Necessity, Volition, and Love, Frankfurt, 
Cambridge 1999, S. 146-154). 
31 Honneth, a.a.O., S. 10, 12. Arendt, Hannah, „We Refugees“, in: Menorah Journal 31 
(1943), S. 69ff. Bereits Jean Paul Sartre hatte anlässlich seiner Reise durch die USA 
seinem Befremden Ausdruck verliehen, dass die „schwarze Bevölkerung“ wie „Luft“ 
betrachtet würde, siehe hierzu von Robert Bernasconi „Sartre‟s Gaze Returned: The 
Transformation of the Phenomenology of Racism” (in: Graduate Faculty Philosophy 
Journal 18, 2 (1995), S. 201 – 221.  
32 Honneth, Unsichtbarkeit, a.a.O., S. 15. 
33 Honneth, ebd., S. 21. 
34 Honneth, S. 21. 
Ethics of Respect and Human Dignity. A Responsive Reading 
 
159 
 
source of legitimate claims, which demolish the former‟s self-love. 
Consequently, 'confirm' or 'approve' means to equip the addressees with the 
moral authority to dispose of one's own person to the extent that one knows 
one is obliged to execute or refrain from particular classes of actions. 
However, this formulation should not conceal that the putting oneself under 
an obligation here simultaneously represents a kind of voluntary motivation: 
by acknowledging someone and granting him the meaning of a moral 
authority over myself, I am simultaneously already motivated to treat him 
in future in accordance with his value.35  
Yet too many open controversies. In the first place it remains questionable 
whether the Kantian construct of constraint is not resolved in the moment of 
“voluntary action”. The obligation, which compels me to respect, is secondly 
reduced in the paradigm of the care of the adult for the infant to an almost 
reflex-like automatism, although it has to be conceded that this special form 
of the relationship has an immanent form of constraint, which among other 
things is related to the defective character of the newly born. But above all in 
the third place the recognition approach conceals the problem that is actually 
at issue and which must first be doubled by a genealogy of morality. It is 
after all not at issue that what currently applies from our perspective is that 
“a black person” should also be respected in the same manner. With this 
perspective we are already operating on the basis of established moral 
standards. What by contrast is at issue is how those actors can be moved to 
respect those “invisible” people as equal individuals. Consequently, the 
problem would be one of constitution, not of recognition. It would be a 
problem of the overshadowing and transcendence of normalisations, not of 
identification and willing acceptance. Western history has demonstrated only 
too well how tremendously laborious and excruciating the process of arriving 
at the moral perception of a person as a someone to respect has been and still 
is.  
Consequently, what we have to deal with is less a theory of motivational 
readiness as far rather the question how the ethical conjunctive (we should 
respect others as ends in themselves) is not betrayed. 
 
 
3. Rainer Forst: Respect as right to justification  
 
Rainer Forst attempts to formulate a right-oriented version of respect. He 
too takes up the phenomenon of “overlooking” as form of elementary disdain 
                                                 
35 Honneth, S. 22. Man vergleiche auf die dialogtheoretische Fassung bei Albrecht 
Wellmer, Ethik und Dialog. Elemente des moralischen Urteils bei Kant und in der 
Diskursethik, Frankfurt am Main 1986. 
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for others, but interprets it more critically than Honneth as an infringement 
of human dignity. At stake is an infringment of a fundamental status and not 
an impairment of a condition (e.g. life in poverty as a general circumstance of 
conditions unfit for human beings). Deficits of respect exist in "being 
ignored”, in “not counting", in “being air in terms of legitimation”. The 
violation of dignity as lack of respect is not given with the lack of means for 
an „existence worthy of human beings‟. Violating respect and dignity consists 
rather in the deliberate violation of the moral status of being a person to 
whom one owes justifications. It is the phenomenon of legitimatory 
invisibility, of being controlled without sufficient justification, of being 
ignored. This can take on more or less drastic forms, from forms of social 
exclusion to physical torment etc. Being acknowledged in my dignity as 
person means to be respected.36  
Respect is reformulated in this manner “as end in itself” as respect for people 
as creatures with a right to justification which must be respected: “[...] Being 
treated in accordance with this dignity means being respected as such a 
person”37 This “perception” of respect, which annuls “being air in a 
legitimatory sense", exists if the two conditiosn of reciprocity and generality 
exist as recognition criteria of the discursive justification.38  
In accordance with this understanding people recognise each other as 
creatures who "need" reasons, as creatures endowed with reason and yet 
finite, vulnerable creatures [...]."39  
However, what remains curiously underexamined in these considerations is 
how this obligation arises between the various instances of “I” (my duty) and 
“you” (you vis-à-vis the claim). For this purpose the respect for the law 
might need to be divided into various pronominal dimensions. This could 
occur in a responsive theory of respect. 
 
 
4. Bernhard Waldenfels: A possible responsive version of respect  
 
The transition from Aristotle‟s ethics of virtue to Kant‟s deontology could be 
framed in the following formula: we are dealing with the transition from a 
creature that has a logos to a person who follows a nomos. As Waldenfels 
shows in his brillant interpretations, this nomos can be described, but not 
justified (Kant, ch. V, A 80), since it would lead to an endless regress (Kant, 
                                                 
36 Forst, Rainer, Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung. Elemente einer konstruktivistischen Theorie 
der Gerechtigkeit, Frankfurt am Main 2007, S. 590f. 
37 Forst, ebd., S. 593. 
38 Forst, Rainer, ebd., S. 22. Forst knüpft an Raz an. Raz Joseph, Praktische Gründe und 
Normen, Frankfurt am Main 2006. 
39 Forst, Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung, a.a.O., S. 595f. 
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MST A 39, 41; IV, 532, 534). Therefore the law of reason itself is without 
cause and cannot be justified (GMS B 128). (Urfaktum) Consequently, 
respect for the person as end in itself is respect for the person as "subject of 
the practical law" (ch. V, A 156). This respect is shown in the central 
imperative: “Act in a way that you treat humanity, both in your person as 
well as in the person of everyone else, at all times as an end, never merely as a 
means."40 In the general and neutral version the pronominal form of 
responding to a demand is suppressed. On the one hand, the dimension of 
constraint (you should …) is returned to voluntarism, as is the case in 
Tugendhat‟s ethics. “If one perceives the moral as a command for the will, a 
voluntative premiss (is) nevertheless assumed, which would have to run: „If 
you wish to be rational  …‟”41 
However, to prevent inhuman treatment of the other in the form of 
disrespect a guarantee must first be provided that someone is perceived as 
worthy of respect. Therefore, respect of his or her claims would on the first 
level not be a case of identifying perception, but rather a reply to a claim on 
me and which I cannot and should not refuse. In this sense one could take up 
Kant‟s mention of debt, which we owe in respect. We remain in debt, when 
we refuse claims. Consequently, Waldenfels describes them in analogy to two 
very strong motives of classical philosophy, on the one hand analogously to 
akrasia and on the other as inversion of evil: “Disrespect means more than 
inattentiveness, which one can understand analogously to a weakness of will 
as a weakness attentiveness. Disrespect means that one withholds from the 
other the respect due. What is involved here is a reversal of attentiveness, 
comparable to the “reversal of the heart” which Kant assumes in his study of 
religion (B 36).”42 For this an inner dialogicity is required, which could be 
expressed in responsive words: “The command of respect and the prohibition 
of disrespect already presuppose that we listen to something, that we notice 
and pay heed. As Kant also determines in his Metaphysics of morals, the duty 
of conscience consists solely in “to heighten our attentiveness to the voice of 
                                                 
40 Immanuel Kant, „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten“, (GMS) Akademie-Ausgabe, 
(Kants gesammelte Schriften, hg. von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, 1902ff.), IV 429 (B 66f.) Zitiert wird auch nach der von Wilhelm 
Weischedel herausgegebenen Sonderausgabe in 10 Bänden (Kant, Werke, Darmstadt 
51983). Paton und Ross unterscheiden drei Hauptformeln, die Naturgesetzformel, die sie der 
Gesetzesformel, und die Reich-der Zwecke-Formel, die sie der Autonomieformel zuordnen 
(Paton, H. J., Der kategorische Imperativ, Berlin  1962, S. 129 – 132; Ross, D., Kant’s 
Ethical Theory. A Commentary on the „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten“, Oxford 
1969, S. 43f.). Vgl. auch Geissmann, Georg, „Die Formeln des kategorischen Imperativs“ 
(in: Kant-Studien, (93), 2002, S. 374- 384) Geissmann referiert auch auf Ebbinghaus, der 
nicht drei oder fünf, sondern 10 Formeln vorstellt (S. 375). 
41 Tugendhat, Ernst, Vorlesungen über Ethik, Frankfurt am Main 1993, S. 70. 
42 Waldenfels, Phänomenologie der Aufmerksamkeit, a.a.O., S. 279. 
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the inner judge and apply all means (therefore only indirect duty) to make 
sure he is heard.”43 Therefore it might make sense to interpret the Kantian 
formulation of the imperative in two different tones. The law applies insofar 
as it establishes a general and propositional claim on the neutral and trans-
personal level. However, if “I” as addressee subject myself to the claim of the 
other and demonstrate its truth through loyalt, then the law must appeal to 
me. In this moment the valdity (Geltung) changes in the appeal of the voice, 
which is directed towards me and demands of me that I act towards the You 
in a particular and specific manner: “This is why we distinguish between the 
voice of the law, in which a „Thou shalt‟ is expressed and the statutes in 
which something is ordered and forbidden in the form of a „thou shalt 
(not).‟”44 The law that says to me “Do this…” consequently demands an 
obligatio in the meaning of gerundive action: “But if by contrast we keept to 
what happens in hearing itself, what is expressed in the imperative is what 
must be done by the addressee (cf. Latin mihi faciendum est). The should, 
which Kant takes to its utmost extent, is something which approaches me 
before I approach it. It compels my respect before I follow my own feeling of 
respect and demonstrate my respect or disrespect.”45 We cannot here make 
explicit to what extent the responsive theory describes this should in the 
form of the "inescapability of reply." But we can in closing indicate in what 
contexts these discussion might unfold their meaning for respect. 
 
 
5. Perspectives on responsiveness 
 
If we recall the opening quotation of Ansgar Beckermann, it quickly becomes 
clear that sentences like “I must..”, “You must…” or “We must…” cannot 
be translated into a neutralised form without a loss of meaning. On the one 
hand, a claim due cannot be compared to a causal effect, on the other, the 
classic attribution paradigm comes up against its limitations if we have to be 
just to a singular counterpart. We have to deal not only with the question 
                                                 
43 Ausg. Weischedel, IV, S. 532. 
44 Waldenfels, Bernhard, Schattenrisse der Moral, Frankfurt am Main 2006, S. 32. 
Waldenfels zeigt hier auch, inwiefern bei Max Scheler (mit dem Buber ebenfalls vertraut 
war) dieser appellative Aspekt in die normative Fassung rückintegriert wird und letztlich 
axiologisch fundiert wird. Vergleiche zum Spannungsverhältnis von Appell und Antwort 
auch Allerkamp, die allerdings nur beiläufig auf Buber eingeht und diesen Aspekt nicht 
streift (Allerkamp, Andrea, Anruf, Adresse, Appell. Figurationen der Kommunikation in 
Philosophie und Literatur, Bielefeld 2005, S. 128f.). 
45 Waldenfels, Schattenrisse der Moral, a.a.O., S. 29; Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft 
A 134. 
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how I know "which particular object is a rational creature."46 Fichte even 
radicalises this thought with regard to the aspect of encounter: “That 
acknowledgement either does not occur at all or it occurs in a moment 
without one being aware of the reasons.”47 In truth, the mother treats her 
child as a personal counterpart with whom she speaks and does not treat it as 
a thing (Honneth). The doctor treats a patient with dementia as a someone 
on whom he focuses his attention, not as an everyman who is described in the 
third person or even written off as a broken thing or who is shunted off as a 
"human vegetable.” “Is the person, who is addressed, previously understood 
in their meaning? By no means. The person addressed is not first an object of 
understanding and then someone speaks to [...]. Understanding a person is to 
speak to them.”48 
 
                                                 
46 Mit dieser Frage hatte Fichte Kants Moraltheorie hinterfragt, siehe J. G. Fichte, 
Grundlage des Naturrechts, Hamburg 1979, S. 80. Schopenhauer hatte in seiner Kritik an 
Kants Konzept von Menschenwürde diese pronominale Radikalisierung noch verfehlt.  
47 Fichte, ebd., S. 81. 
48 Levinas, Emmanuel, Zwischen uns. Versuche über das Denken an den Anderen, München/ 
Wien 1995, S. 17. Ich danke Gregory Martin für die Hilfe bei der Übersetzung.  
